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FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION
Indirect Discrimination - Meaning of ‘Considerable Difference’ Between Those Affected and
Those Not - Justification - ECJ and House of Lords
R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Seymour-Smith Case C-167/97, [1999] All
ER (EC) 97 ECJ; [2000] 1 All ER 857 HL
After years of litigation - including a reference to the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) - the House of Lords has
delivered the final judgement in the case of Seymour-Smith.  At its heart, the claim was that the two-year
qualification period for Unfair Dismissal rights[1] discriminated against women, because women
are more transient in the workforce than men.
The claim was for indirect discrimination: that is where a facially neutral measure has  an  adverse
impact on a protected group.  A simple example would be: ‘Librarians wanted, applicants must be
at least six feet tall.’  That requirement would not directly discriminate on grounds of sex  or  race,
but it would, indirectly, adversely affect women and certain racial groups.  Indirect  discrimination
is unlawful unless the defendant can justify the measure irrespective of  sex  or  race,  as  the  case
may be.  Thus the theory of indirect  discrimination  is  based  upon  two  broad  limbs.   First,  the
claimant must show that their protected group (eg women) was adversely affected by a measure or
practice (the prime facie case).  Second, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the measure.
Eventually, the case of Seymour-Smith turned on two issues: (1) what degree of disparity was
necessary to establish a prima facie case; and (2) whether the measure was justified.  In this case
the ECJ and the House of Lords advanced and, to some degree, clarified the law in these areas.
Nonetheless, the English judges were divided over the application of the law to the facts.
The Facts
In May 1991 Christo & Co dismissed Ms Seymour-Smith from her job.  As she had been
employed for only fifteen months, she did not qualify to claim Unfair Dismissal (under the
Employment Protection Act 1978).  This was because the qualifying period had been extended to
two years by the then Secretary of State for Employment (Tom King), using delegated
legislation[2] (‘the Order’).
Ms Seymour-Smith challenged this Order as being contrary to European Community law: Article 119[3] of the
Treaty of Rome provides for equal pay between men and women at work.[4]
The Annual Labour Force Surveys was accepted by both sides as evidence of the impact of the two-
year requirement.  These are surveys of the UK’s total workforce.
They reveal that in 1985, for example, the total workforce in the UK was 18.73 million.  If the Order were neutral in
its effect, some 8.48 million men and 5.44 million women, would have qualified under the two-year rule.  However,
the survey revealed that, in fact, only 5.07 million women qualified.  So the Order adversely affected some 370,000
women.
That was the situation expressed in numbers.  However, a claim for indirect discrimination must be
based upon proportions, not numbers.  Here are the proportions of male and female qualifiers, for
the years 1985 (when the Order was introduced) to 1991 (when Ms Seymour-Smith was
dismissed). The calculations of disparity are to the right:
|Year          |% of  Males   |% of Females  |Disparity     |% of women to |
|              |with more than|with more than|              |men in        |
|              |2 years       |2 years       |              |advantaged    |
|              |              |              |              |group         |
|1985          |77.4          |68.9          |8.5           |89            |
|1986          |77.2          |68.4          |8.8           |  88.6        |
|1987          |75.3          |67.1          |8.2           |  89.1        |
|1988          |73.4          |65.6          |7.8           |  89.4        |
|1989          |72.0          |63.8          |8.2           |  88.6        |
|1990          |72.5          |64.1          |8.4           |  88.4        |
|1991          |74.5          |67.4          |7.1           |90            |
We can see that for 1985 the disparity was eight-and-a-half percentage points.  That means, roughly, for every ten
men who qualified for Unfair Dismissal rights, only nine women did so (expressed in the far right column as 89 per
cent).  That figure remained roughly constant until 1991, the year of Ms Seymour-Smith’s dismissal.  The first issue
was whether these figures were evidence that the Order had caused a disparate impact, so that Ms Seymour-Smith
could establish a prime facie case.  If this were so, the Secretary of State would have to justify the
Order.
The Decision
The Divisional Court found that the disparity was not large enough to establish a prime facie case.
 They went on the hold that if there were a prime facie case, the Secretary of State had failed to
justify the Order.  The Court of Appeal found that there was a prime facie case and that the
Secretary of State had failed to justify the Order.  The House of Lords referred the case to the ECJ
to rule on, inter alia: (1) the degree of disparity necessary to establish a prime facie case; (2) at
what point in time the Order should be assessed, for instance, when it came into force (1985) or
when Ms Seymour-Smith was dismissed (1991); and (3) the test for justification of a Government
measure.  The case then returned to the House of Lords for a final decision.
The House of Lords found against Ms Seymour-Smith.  But this unanimous decision was not straightforward.  A
majority (Lords Nicholls, Goff and Jauncey) held that Ms Seymour-Smith had made out a prime facie case, but
that the Secretary of State had justified the Order. The minority (Lords Slynn and Steyn) found
that the difference was not considerable, and so no prime facie case had been made out.  They did
not consider the issue of justification.  This is how the House of Lords dealt with each question of
law:
 (1)       Degree of disparity
It was common ground that any disparity would have to be ‘considerable’ for a prime facie case.  However, the
ECJ defined the word ‘considerable’ liberally.   After stating that a difference had to be
considerable, the Court of Justice stated that there could also be a prime facie case where
‘statistical evidence revealed a lesser [than considerable] but persistent and relatively constant
disparity over a long period.…’[5]   In the House of Lords, Lord Nicholls (who gave the majority
judgement) reconciled these two approaches thus: ‘A considerable disparity can be more readily
established if the statistical evidence covers a long period and the figures show a persistent and
relatively constant disparity.  In such a case a lesser statistical disparity may suffice to show that
the disparity is considerable than if the statistics cover only a short period or if they present an
uneven picture.’[6]
(2)        Time of assessment
The ECJ noted that it might be appropriate to look at the figures compiled after 1985 for an indication of the impact
on women,[7]  and ruled that it was for the national court, taking into account the circumstances, to
decide at what point in time the Order should be assessed.  The House of Lords assessed the Order
as things stood in 1991, the time of the Ms Seymour-Smith’s dismissal.
Application of the law in the House of Lords
The ECJ commented that if the assessment were made for 1985 alone, there would not be ‘on the face of it’ a
considerable difference.[8]  But they did not give an opinion if the assessment were made for 1991.
The majority in the House of Lords found that the statistics assessed at 1991 showed a
‘considerable’ difference between the proportions.  Lord Nicholls admitted that the figures were
‘in borderline country’ but decided:
‘I find myself driven to the conclusion that a persistent and constant disparity...in respect of the entire male and
female labour forces of this country over a period of seven years cannot be brushed aside and dismissed as
insignificant or inconsiderable....I think that these figures are adequate to demonstrate that the extension of the
qualifying period had a considerably greater adverse impact on women than men.’[9]
For the minority Lord Slynn held that: ‘…it cannot be said that [the Order] actually affects a considerably higher
percentage of women than men…. It would in any event…be odd if there was no discrimination in 1985, but 1991 on
a slightly higher percentage on women qualifying (and one as part of a rising trend) there was discrimination.’[10]
For the minority the case was dead.  Hence only Lord Nicholls’ judgement considered the issue of
justification.
(3)        Justification
Lord Nicholls restated the justification formula provided by the ECJ for this case.  A Member
State must show that the measure: ‘(1) ...reflects a legitimate aim of social policy, (2) that that aim
is unrelated to any discrimination based on sex, and (3) that the Member State could reasonably
consider that the means chosen were suitable for attaining that aim.’[11]
Lord Nicholls added some general comments.  First, he held that the ECJ’s formula showed that the burden (on the
Secretary of State) was ‘not as heavy as previously thought.’   This was because of the absence of the word or
‘necessary’ in the new formula.  Next, Lord Nichols declared that ‘Governments must be able to govern’ and  ‘are to
be afforded a broad measure of discretion’.[12]
Finally, when applying the law of justification, Lord Nicholls took a two-stage approach.  First, the introduction of
the Order and second, the continuation of it till 1991.  It was possible, his Lordship stated, that a measure, ‘lawful
when adopted, may become unlawful.’[13]
On the introduction of the Order, the Government’s argument was that it would encourage employment by reducing
the risks to employers of  ‘unjustified involvement’ in Unfair Dismissal claims.  They relied on several reports,
which, on the whole, suggested that a small minority of employers might be inhibited, by the Unfair Dismissal
legislation, from taking on staff.  Lord Nichols accepted this argument, stating that: ‘To condemn the Minister for
failing to carry out further research or prepare an impact analysis...would be unreasonable’.[14]
Lord Nicholls then turned to the second question of the continuance of the Order. The Government’s duty was stated
thus:
‘...if the Government introduces a measure which proves to have a disparately adverse impact on women, [it] is under
a duty to take reasonable steps to monitor the working of the measure.  The Government must review the position
periodically.  The greater the disparity of impact, the greater the diligence can reasonably be expected of the
Government.’[15]
By 1991 there was no evidence that the Order had increased employment opportunities.  However, Lord Nicholls
stated that Governments also should be afforded a broad margin of discretion when monitoring such measures.  He
continued: ‘The Government was entitled to allow a reasonable period to elapse before deciding whether the Order
had achieved its objective.... The contrary view would impose an unrealistic burden on the Government in the present
case.’[16]  Thus, the majority held that the Secretary of State had justified the two-year
requirement for Unfair Dismissal rights.
Analysis
(1)        The degree of disparity
The majority showed a fuller understanding than the minority of the ECJ’s formula.
For the minority, Lord Slynn said - in effect - that if the disparity in 1985 was not considerable,
how could it be so in 1991, when the disparity was even closer?  He treated each of the six years
in isolation, rather than as a whole.  That disregards the ECJ’s guidance to look for a ‘persistent
and…constant disparity over a long period’.  The majority took the correct approach by assessing,
as a whole, the figures for six years.
However, the ECJ formula is not entirely clear.  It appears contradictory.  On the one hand the
disparity must be ‘considerable’.  On the other, it can be ‘less than considerable’.  Lord Nicholls
attempted to reconcile this by stating – in effect - that a less than considerable disparity over a
long period can amount to a considerable disparity.  This has the convenience of being consistent
with the domestic legislation, which demands a ‘considerable difference’.[17]   But it has little
else in its favour.  What happens when another novel case arises, where even the new ‘flexible
formula’ is inappropriate?  For instance, a case with a large sample, a marginal impact, but only
one set of data: a large company making hundreds redundant, selects part-timers first.  The result
being that a marginally higher proportion of women are made redundant.  Statisticians may testify
that the disparity is significant.  They could not have used the ‘long, persistent and constant’
formula to conclude this, but their method would have been credible.  A tribunal would have the
choice between verbally distorting this appropriate and credible method to accord with the
modifier ‘considerable’, or denying that there was discrimination.  The better view is that the ECJ
added an alternative to the ‘considerable’ test.   And where appropriate, the lower courts should
be able to add other credible tests or calculations.  There should no longer be a need, in
every case, for a considerable disparity.
More fundamentally, this case highlights an apparent difference, between the European legislation and the case law,
over the degree of disparity required to establish a prime facie case of discrimination.  The legislation is
absolute.  For instance, Article 141 (ex 119) provides for ensuring ‘full’ equality.  The 1975 Equal
Pay Directive directs that Member States shall abolish ‘all’ discrimination.[18]  And the Equal
Treatment Directive[19] states that there shall be no discrimination ‘whatsoever’.  The
absoluteness is common to the legislation on equal pay and equal treatment.[20]
However, the ECJ has always held[21] that there should be a considerable disparity in cases of indirect
discrimination.   It appears that the ECJ has diluted the legislation to outlaw only discrimination
which is considerable.   This seems more peculiar when, in cases of direct discrimination, the
courts do not demand a considerable difference in treatment.
The only way to explain this difference is to treat the legislation as a rule of law, and the ECJ guidance as a rule of
proof.   One of the purposes of proof in cases of indirect discrimination is to prevent prime facie
cases being brought, where the disparity is the result of chance.  The ‘considerable difference’ rule
can do this in many cases, but not all.  That rule should not be used to disqualify genuine cases of
discrimination, where the disparity is small (or ‘less than considerable’).  Seymour-Smith is such a
case.  The ECJ recognised this when holding that a prime facie case could be established on a less-
than-considerable disparity.
The ECJ may have recognised this, but the House of Lords did not.  During his judgement Lord Nicholls said: ‘The
obligation is to avoid...requirements having a considerable disparity of impact.’[22]  The majority found that
there had been considerable discrimination, not that there was considerable evidence of
discrimination.  The minority proceeded on the same basis.  Lord Slynn found the figures to be
reliable (or not ‘fortuitous’).[23]  The figures showed that women were disadvantaged.  Yet he
held there was no discrimination.  That can only be explained if he was looking for proof of
considerable discrimination, rather than considerable proof of discrimination.
What comes out of this case is not an answer to the first question: ‘what degree of disparity was necessary to establish
a prime facie case?’  Rather, it is a realisation that the rubric ‘considerable difference’ can be no
more than one of several methods of evaluating a prime facie case.  A specific answer to the
question, say ‘20 percentage points’,[24]  would shackle the courts with one narrow rigid definition
of indirect discrimination.  As we have seen, to do that would deny some legitimate claims and
defeat the goal of ‘no discrimination ‘whatsoever.
Negative or positive figures
Council for Ms Seymour-Smith advanced an alternative comparison.  He compared the
disadvantaged groups in this case.  In 1985, for example, 22.6 per cent of women could not meet
the two-year requirement.  The figure for men was 31 per cent.  Thus for every ten women
disadvantaged, there were only seven men.  That is clearly a considerable difference.  However,
all the courts in this case based their decisions on the ‘positive’ figures.   The ‘negative’ argument
is attractive for no other reason than we are dealing with a law to protect those who are
disadvantaged by a measure.  It is the negative figures that represent them.  Nevertheless, the
courts preferred the figures representing the most people.  However, Lord Slynn said:  ‘If these
[positive] figures are not sufficient or significant, it may be necessary to look elsewhere,
including...the figures of those who do not qualify’.[25]   Thus it may be possible to use negative
figures in future cases.  But there remains a barrier to domestic courts and tribunals doing this.
Section 1(1)(b), Sex Discrimination Act states that the comparison should be between those
groups who ‘can comply’.[26]   As things stand, negative figures can only used if the case is
brought under EC legislation.
(2)        Justification
The standard test for justification is the ‘Bilka test.’[27]  The defendant must show that the
measure corresponds to a genuine need and is suitable and necessary to achieve that need.   For
the specific class of cases where Governments introduce measures in pursuit of social policy
(Seymour-Smith is such a case), it is settled law that the measure must reflect a necessary aim of
the social policy and be suitable and necessary for achieving that aim.[28]  The ECJ restated this
in Seymour-Smith.[29]  The ECJ also noted that although Governments have a broad margin of
discretion, it could not be used to frustrate the fundamental principle of equal pay.  And with a
clear allusion to the Government’s defence in this case the ECJ said that ‘mere generalisations
concerning the capacity of a...measure to encourage recruitment are not enough...’ to justify the
measure.  However, the ECJ’s definitive formula, provided in this case (set out above), stated only
that the measure should be ‘suitable’ to achieve the aim.[30]
In the House of Lords, Lord Nicholls cited only this last part (the formula) of the ECJ’s views on justification.  The
absence of the word ‘necessary’ in the formula was enough for Lord Nicholls to conclude that the test was no longer
as stringent as previously thought.[31]
Read as a whole the ECJ’s judgement clearly envisages that the measure must be ‘necessary’ to achieve an aim.  It
also makes clear that the Order, supported by no more than a generalisation (that if employers have less fear of Unfair
Dismissal claims, they will employ more people), was not justified.  Even on his less stringent test, Lord Nicholls’
decision was surprising.  The Government offered no evidence that, after six years, the Order had made
any difference to recruitment.  If such a policy failed for six years, the Government could cling to
no more than hope and political dogma as justification.  In these circumstances the Order was not
even ‘suitable’ to encourage recruitment, let alone necessary.
Without Unfair Dismissal rights, a worker can be fired, with proper notice, for no reason.  It can be on the whim of
the employer.  For some fourteen years,[32] hundreds of thousands of British women worked without
the protection of Unfair Dismissal rights, which were meanwhile being enjoyed by men.  That was
solely because of a useless law that achieved nothing bar making a huge number of the female
workforce insecure in their jobs.   This decision recognised the Government’s discretion to
maintain such laws.
Conclusion
This case exposed the ‘considerable difference’ rubric as too rigid to be a rule of law or an
exclusive rule of evidence.  It should now be read as one of many methods to evaluate statistics.
Accordingly, the courts must recognise and act on this.  At present, only the European legislation
affords the latitude for them to do this.  The domestic legislation needs to be amended to suit.  The
offending phrases in the domestic definitions of indirect discrimination[33] are ‘considerably
smaller’ and ‘those who can comply’.  With more open-ended legislation the courts will be free to
use appropriate methods to evaluate claims, including the use of ‘negative’ statistics.
On a sadder note, we must reflect upon the competence and ambition of our senior judges to achieve the goal
expressed in the European legislation, of no discrimination ‘whatsoever’.  The minority misunderstood and
misapplied a simple formula of analysing six year’s statistics as a whole, by analysing each year in isolation.
 The majority, when asked to uphold a fundamental principle of European law, collapsed under a
Government defence based upon no more than hope and dogma.  This does not leave one
optimistic about the future of discrimination law, nor for that matter, the Human Rights Act.
Michael Connolly, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Westminster
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